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Previous studies nd a strong and positive empirical connection between health sta-
tus and the share of risky assets held in household portfolios. But is this relationship
truly causal, in the sense that households respond to changes in health by altering their
portfolio allocation, or does it simply re
ect unobserved dierences across households?
We nd that the link between health and risky assets depends crucially on the economet-
ric treatment of unobserved heterogeneity. Once we account adequately for unobserved
household dierences, we nd no statistically signicant eect of health status on either
portfolio allocations or ownership among older households (those with respondents 70
and older) in the Health and Retirement Study. Younger households, in contrast, do
seem to adjust their portfolios on both the extensive and intensive margins in response
to health shocks.
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11 Introduction
Does health status aect portfolio choice? The life-cycle theory of saving suggests several
reasons to expect a relationship. Most directly, health shocks could aect the marginal
utility of consumption and therefore alter households' valuation of risk.1 Additionally,
if uncertain medical expenses increase background risk (in a manner similar to income
volatility), then declining health may make risky investments less desirable.2 Finally, a
decline in health may lead to lower future income due to reduced labor supply or lower life
expectancy. Since future income can substitute for safe assets in a household's portfolio
(Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson, 1992), declining health could increase the demand for safe
nancial assets.
Several empirical studies nd that poor health is indeed associated with a safer house-
hold portfolio allocation. Rosen and Wu (2004) nd that poor health is associated with a
reduction in the probability of owning any stocks or mutual funds of about 1.7 percentage
points and a reduction in the share of risky assets of around 2 percentage points. Ed-
wards (forthcoming) uses a similar estimation strategy and also nds a negative eect of
poor health on the stock share of assets. Christelis, Jappelli, and Padula (2006) nd small
negative correlations between poor health and stock-holding in a cross-sectional data-set
covering ten major European countries. Coile and Milligan (2006) perform \event studies"
of health changes and nd a small negative eect of a chronic health shock on the probabil-
ity of holding IRAs or stocks, though no eect on the marginal share. Berkowitz and Qiu
(2006), however, nd that the relationship between health and portfolio allocation mostly
disappears after controlling adequately for dierences in nancial wealth between sick and
healthy households.
Indeed, one major concern with many of the empirical studies is that a correlation be-
tween health and portfolio choice could re
ect unobserved heterogeneity across households
rather than a causal link. For example, if unobserved characteristics such as risk attitudes
and impatience are correlated with both health status and portfolio choice, a regression
might uncover a statistically signicant correlation even in the absence of a causal relation-
ship. Some of the previous studies (e.g., Rosen and Wu (2004) and Edwards (forthcoming))
1As pointed out by Edwards (2006, 2007, forthcoming), health shocks could either increase or decrease
the marginal utility of consumption. For example, diminished health could reduce the enjoyment of some
leisure activities, such as playing golf, taking a trip, or eating out. On the other hand, worsening health
could increase the marginal value of labor-saving consumption, such as taxi rides or cleaning services.
2Pang and Warshawsky (2008) nd in a numerical model of health expenses and portfolio choice that
medical expense risk generates a shift away from risky assets. French and Jones (2004) nd in a dynamic
programming model with uncertain medical expenses that both medical expense shocks and the uncertainty
surrounding future expenses can have a substantial eect on consumption and saving decisions. Finally,
as demonstrated in Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes (1995), the social insurance 
oor provided by Medicaid
could distort the incentives of lower-wealth households. We do not emphasize this channel, however, since
few stock holders in the data qualify as having low wealth.
2attempt to control for unobserved heterogeneity by utilizing panel data in a random-eects
regression framework. However, this approach requires a strong assumption of zero corre-
lation between the unobserved eect and right-hand-side variables; in the presence of such
correlation, the coecient estimates are inconsistent.3
In this paper, we control more carefully for unobserved heterogeneity by utilizing the
1998 through 2006 waves of the Health and Retirement Study in correlated random eects
and xed eects specications that do not impose the strong assumptions required by
random eects models. We nd that younger households (ages 51 to 70) do appear to
adjust their portfolio allocations a bit in response to changes in self-reported health status,
but not to increases in out-of-pocket medical costs. Older households (over age 70), in
contrast, show little responsiveness to our health measures. This pattern is suggestive of
dierent channels connecting health and portfolio decisions at dierent ages. We conclude
that there is little evidence that older households adjust their stock portfolios in response
to health shocks.
2 Data
Like several previous studies (Berkowitz and Qiu, 2006; Coile and Milligan, 2006; Rosen
and Wu, 2004), we use the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which is particularly well-
suited because it provides longitudinal data on both health status and household portfolios.
However, unlike previous studies, we begin with the 1998 wave because it is the rst to
represent all cohorts aged 51 and over.4 Our sample is therefore older, on average, and
more representative of aged households than those used in the previous studies.
Table 1 provides a few demographic statistics for our sample. For the entire sample of
13,703 households, the average age is about 66 years, about 7 years older than the average
reported for single households in Rosen and Wu (2004). While about half of the entire
sample is married, single females make up about 47 percent of the older subsample. Most
households report having children (only 10 percent do not), and there are, on average, about
three children per household.
3Rosen and Wu (2004) also address the unobserved heterogeneity problem by including survey responses
related to preferences about risk, planning horizons, and expectations. However, it is dicult to imagine
that all unobserved heterogeneity can be removed.
4The original 1992 cohort of the HRS included households aged 51-61 in 1992. The cohorts added in the
1998 wave are the War Baby cohort (aged 51-56 in 1998), the Children of the Depression cohort (68-74),
and the Aging and Health Dynamics cohort (75 and older). Since the HRS cohort was aged 57-67 in 1998,
the 1998 waves thus covers the full population of households aged 51 and older. The obvious downside of
beginning in 1998 is that the panel is shorter (ve waves rather than eight), but in this case we decided it
was more valuable to represent the full age distribution than to have a longer panel.
32.1 Wealth Measures
Our measures of stock-holding include directly held stocks and stocks held in mutual funds
and trusts, but exclude stocks held in retirement accounts. While many households own
stocks in retirement accounts, we focus on the narrower denition (excluding retirement
accounts) because it has less measurement error and thus oers a cleaner test of the rela-
tionship between health and portfolio choice.5
Table 2 shows the evolution of household wealth and portfolio shares from 1998 to
2006. In this table, we dene our age groups according to the older household member's
age in 1998 and follow the cohorts forward throughout the time period. The table shows
several important dierences between younger and older households. For example, older
households have more nancial wealth but much less retirement wealth, re
ecting both a
cohort eect (e.g., younger households are more likely to have participated in 401(k) plans)
and a drawdown eect of older households tapping retirement wealth. Older households
also have more nonnancial wealth than younger households and are less likely to own stock,
particularly in later years. Those that do own stock, however, hold more than their younger
counterparts, resulting in similar stock shares of nancial wealth.
For both groups real net nancial wealth rises considerably toward the end of the sample
period, by about $62,000 (61 percent) for younger households and by about $34,000 (25
percent) for older households. Non-nancial wealth, consisting mostly of housing, rises
even more, re
ecting the dramatic gains in house prices over this period. At the same time,
stock ownership rates drop throughout the sample period, with a net decline of 10 percent
for younger households and about 13 percent for older households. In contrast, the stock
shares of nancial wealth are relatively constant across time for older households but fall
noticeably in 2004 and 2006 for the younger age group.
2.2 Health Measures
We focus on two measures to capture respondents' current health: self-reported health
status and out-of-pocket medical expenses. Respondents can describe their current health
status as \excellent," \very good," \good," \fair," or \poor." The self-reported health
5The HRS asks respondents directly about the value of stock shares held by themselves, in mutual funds,
and in trusts, but it does not ask directly about the value of stocks held in retirement accounts. Rather, for
both IRAs and DC plans, the survey asks, \Is the money in this account invested mostly in stocks, mostly
in interest-earning assets, is it about evenly split between these, or what?" To test whether our results are
sensitive to our denition of the stock share, we re-estimated all of our equations with a more comprehensive
measure of stock holding that uses simple but fairly crude rules to map the survey responses into retirement-
account stock shares. We nd that the broader denition of the stock share does not materially aect our
ndings about health and portfolio choice.
4variable is ranked 1 to 5, with 1 for \excellent" and 5 for \poor."6
Out of pocket (OOP) medical expenses include uninsured costs over the previous two
years related to the following: doctor visits, outpatient surgery, hospital and nursing home
stays, prescription drugs, home health care, and special medical facilities or services. As
is well-known, the cross-sectional distribution of medical expenses is characterized by a
very long upper tail (see e.g., French and Jones, 2004).7 In our regression analysis, we
therefore use the natural logarithm of OOP expenses. Medical expenses are dierent from
the other two health measures in that they are more endogenous|they are likely to re
ect a
household's propensity to spend on discretionary medical care as well as underlying health
status. We include them because they are an important theoretical channel of causal health
eects, but their potential endogeneity highlights the importance of accounting adequately
for unobserved preference and attitudinal dierences across households.
The HRS also provides an \objective" measure of health|indicators of doctor diagnoses
of high blood pressure, diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart problems, stroke, psychiatric
problems, and arthritis. We focus on the \subjective" self-report because it is more likely
to be related to behavioral changes such as portfolio reallocations. For example, two house-
holds could receive the same diagnosis but report dierent eects on their self-report of
health|either because the conditions are of varying severity, or because of dierences in
attitude toward the health shock (e.g., \stoic" vs. \vulnerable").
Indeed, some evidence for a disconnection between self-reported health and the number
of health conditions can be seen in Table 3, which shows the evolution of the health measures
over the sample period. The two age groups show remarkably little change in average self-
reported health over time. Younger households report an average health status of about 3
(corresponding to \good") and older households consistently average around 3.3 (edging a
bit closer to \fair"). In contrast to the stable behavior of self-reported health, the number
of doctor diagnosed medical conditions increases markedly over the time period for both
age groups. One possibility is that the rates of diagnosis increased over this time period for
reasons unrelated to actual health condition changes (e.g., earlier diagnosis of less-severe
cases). Another explanation, related to the psychological literature on happiness (see, e.g.,
Gilbert 2006), is that individuals adapt to income and health shocks and reset to some
baseline level of well-being.8
6Rosen and Wu (2004) estimate the impact of a health status variable dened as \fair" to \poor," omitting
the other categories. As a robustness check, we also estimate our models with their health status variable,
and we nd no statistically signicant changes in our estimates.
7For example, in our HRS sample, while median OOP expenses are about $1,300 over a two-year period,
the 90th percentile is about $7,300 and the 99th percentile is about $38,000 for singles.
8When we repeat our analysis using the number of diagnosed conditions in place of self-reported health,
we obtain similar results but with smaller and less precisely estimated coecients. We also repeated our
analysis using an indicator for the \worst" conditions, which we somewhat arbitrarily dened as cancer, lung
disease, and heart problems, and found substantially similar results.
5Table 3 also shows that over the 8-year time period medical costs increased by about 125
percent for older households and by about 80 percent for younger households. The increase
probably re
ects a combination of age-related declining health and a general increase in
health expenses above CPI in
ation.
2.3 Controls
In our regression specications, we relate stock holding and asset allocation to our health
measures and other covariates. Controls include wealth, income, age, sex, education, race,
and other household demographics. In models such as these there is often some concern
about endogeneity, since factors aecting stock holding and health can also aect wealth
and income. To help address this issue, we rst control separately for nancial wealth, non-
nancial wealth, and non-capital income.9 We treat these separately because the relationship
between health and wealth could vary across types of wealth|indeed, Berkowitz and Qiu
(2006) nd that health changes aect nancial wealth more than nonnancial wealth, and
that the eect of health on portfolio choice seems to disappear when dierences in nancial
wealth are controlled for. Second, because retired households may respond dierently to
health shocks than working households, we split the sample by age and also include an
indicator variable for whether the household receives Social Security retirement benets.
Finally, and most importantly, we explicitly control for unobserved heterogeneity using two
dierent methodologies, as described in the section below.
To control for the role of expected bequests in household portfolio decisions, we also
include the subjective probability that the household will leave an inheritance of at least
$100,000. About 54 percent of singles report a probability less than 20 percent of leaving a
bequest, 15 percent report a probability between 20 and 80 percent, and 31 percent report
a probability higher than 80 percent. Couples are more likely to report a good chance of
a bequest, with about a third reporting a low probability and just under half reporting a
high probability.
Since the eect of health on household decisions may depend critically on health in-
surance coverage, particularly for younger households who do not yet qualify for Medicare,
we include a control for whether each member of the household has some form of health
insurance (government, employer, or other). While about 98 percent of older households
are insured, the gure drops to about 85 percent among younger households.
A concern pertaining to all studies of health and wealth is the possibility that causality
might run in either direction. If wealth gains improve health, either through improving
access to health care or through some other channel, a causal interpretation of the estimates
9Following Hochguertel (2003), we transform the wealth and income variables using the log odd function:
f(x) = ln(x + 1) if x > 0, and f(x) =  ln( x + 1) if x  0.
6on our health variables would be problematic. A recent study (Michaud and van Soest,
2008), however, tests for reverse causality using dynamic panel data models that control
for unobserved heterogeneity and nds no evidence that changes in wealth drive changes in
health. If wealth does not in
uence health, we conclude that there is little reason to expect
that portfolio shares or ownership would have an independent eect on health.
2.4 Descriptive Analysis
The left-hand columns of Table 4 show average portfolio allocations by our various health
measures. There is clearly a positive correlation between health and stock allocation.
Younger households in the top self-rated health group have about 13 percent more of their
nancial portfolios allocated to stock, on average, than those in the bottom health group,
while for older households, the dierence is about 9 percentage points. A similar result holds
when looking at diagnosed conditions. When we move to out-of-pocket expenses, however,
we see a dierent pattern: households in the middle third allocate about 6 percentage points
more to stock than the lower group, and there is little dierence between the middle and
upper OOP groups. The dierence between the OOP pattern and the other health measures
suggests that OOP may measure something quite dierent from health status: perhaps the
ability or willingness to pay for medical care, or a preference for a greater amount or higher
quality care. Alternatively, it could represent a mechanical eect in which high expenses
are nanced out of liquid (non-stock) assets, driving up the portfolio shares.
One question that arises from these results is whether the dierence in portfolio alloca-
tion by health is coming from the extensive or intensive margins (or both)|that is, whether
sicker households are less likely to own any stocks, and/or less likely to hold smaller stock
shares conditional on owning any. The right-hand columns of the table show that there is
a large dierence on the extensive margin: households in the lowest self-rated health group
are 20 to 25 percentage points less likely to hold any stocks than those in the highest group.
On the other hand, there is little variation on the intensive margin: conditional on owning
any stocks, the average share allocated to equities is between 45 percent and 50 percent for
all health groups.10 This result suggests that the association between health and portfolio
allocation could have more to do with factors that explain why some households don't hold
any stock, rather than factors that in
uence the amount of stock held on the margin.
This observation leads us to the central question of our paper: is the dierence in
portfolio allocation by health status causal, or is it explained by other correlated (and
potentially unobserved) factors? To investigate the extent of causality, we turn to our
correlated random eects and xed eects specications.
10We obtain similar results when we compare across marital status groups (not shown for brevity).
73 Estimation Strategy
3.1 Econometric Models
Our empirical approach exploits the panel nature of the data to account for unobserved
household eects that might in
uence both portfolio choice as well as some of our explana-
tory variables. Following earlier studies, we rst estimate binary response models (probits
and logits) to identify the eect of health on the extensive margin of stock ownership.
We then estimate censored regression models to uncover the link between health and the
marginal stock allocation.
We begin with a standard random eects specication very similar to those used in
earlier studies, and then apply a correlated random eects approach and a xed eects
estimator to test the robustness of the relationship between health and portfolio choice.
3.1.1 Random Eects Probits and Tobits
First we estimate a standard random eects probit model for stock ownership and random
eects Tobit model for marginal allocation. Underlying all of the specications is a latent
variable model of the form:
y
it = xit + ci + uit; (1)
where xit is a vector of exogenous explanatory variables, ci is an unobserved, time-invariant,
individual-specic eect, and uit is an idiosyncratic error. In the participation equations, the
dependent variable yit is an indicator for holding positive amounts of risky assets, such that
yit = 1 if y
it > 0. In the stock-share regressions, y
it represents the desired portfolio share,
but the observed risky asset shares lie between 0 and 1, so that yit = maxf0;minfy
it;1gg.
It can be seen from the specication above that failing to account for unobserved eects
will generally lead to biased coecient estimates unless the omitted variables are perfectly
uncorrelated with any of the independent variables in the regression. The bias comes from
a violation of the orthogonality assumption applied to the composite error in the latent
variable model above. In a pooled regression, E(x0
itj(ci + uit)) will generally be nonzero
if the unobserved factor ci is correlated with the observables x0
it. The standard random
eects models obtain coecient estimates by integrating the unobserved factor ci out of
the likelihood function. However, consistency requires that E(ci j xi1;:::;xiT) = E(ci) = 0,
which is violated whenever there is correlation between ci and any of the xit's. That is, the
random eects estimator is only consistent in the special case that the unobserved eect
is uncorrelated with the observables|unlikely in this context, because some of the key
parameters in the life cycle model, such as risk preference, impatience, and longevity are
unobserved and likely to be correlated with education, wealth, and other observables. To
8some extent, we can control for these factors by including proxy variables, such as subjective
survival probabilities, but these are at best imperfectly measured, and the omitted variables
problem remains. A more promising approach would be to attempt to account for the
correlation between the unobserved random eect and the observables, or better yet, to
dierence out the individual eects via a xed-eects strategy.
3.1.2 Correlated Random Eects Probits and Tobits
Our next step is to account for the potential correlation between unobserved and observed
variables using a correlated random eects regression in the spirit of Chamberlain (1984).11
The correlated random eects approach assumes that the individual eect ci can be written
a linear function of the explanatory variables:
ci = 	 +  xi + ai; ai j xi  N(0;2
a);
where the vector  xi contains the means of the time-varying regressors, 	 is a constant, and
ai is the independent portion of the individual eect.12
In our context, if health is correlated with stock ownership in this specication, then
we have a bit more evidence that the correlation is indicative of a causal eect rather
than spurious correlation. However, this approach requires three assumptions: rst, that
the relationship between unobservables and observables is linear; second, that there are
not other sources of unobserved heterogeneity; and, third, that the errors are normally
distributed. If these conditions do not hold, our omitted variable problem remains. Thus,
our nal specication attempts to dierence out individual eects altogether using a xed
eect approach.
3.1.3 Conditional Fixed Eect Logit and Censoring Models
In general, xed eect dierencing cannot be applied to nonlinear models such as ours,
because the nonlinearity implies that dierencing would not remove the individual eect.
However, Chamberlain (1980) showed that, in the binary choice case, a logit specication
in which the likelihood function is conditioned on the number of observations with yit = 1
can be constructed in a way that eectively removes unobserved heterogeneity from the
choice probabilities. This estimator, called the conditional xed eect logit estimator, can
be used to obtain xed eect estimates from longitudinal binary choice data, such as stock
ownership.
11For recent applications of this model to portfolio choice, see Bakija (2004) and van Soest and Kapetyn
(2006).
12An alternative specication would allow ci to depend on the time-varying xit's, rather than just their
means. The motivation for our specication is that it economizes on degrees of freedom.
9In the continuous case, until recently, there was no estimator that could handle a xed
eect specication in the presence of two-sided censoring. However, a new semi-parametric
estimator developed by Honor e and Leth-Petersen (2006), which generalizes the one-sided
least absolute deviation estimator in Honor e (1992) to handle the case of two-sided censor-
ing, allows us to apply a xed eects estimator to the marginal allocation problem.13
The main strength of the resulting estimator is that it produces consistent estimates
of a xed eect Tobit-type model, and it does so with minimal restrictions on the distri-
bution of the error term (e.g., it need not be normal). A disadvantage of this technique,
however, is that it cannot be used to compute the marginal eects in the censored regres-
sions. The marginal eects typically depend on both the estimated parameters as well as
the unobserved xed eects, but the Honor e' estimator strips these away and estimates the
coecients using only time variation in the regressors. Nevertheless, this estimator pro-
vides a useful way to test the robustness of the relationship between health and portfolio
allocation.14
3.2 Specications
Because the eects of health on participation and allocation could very well be dierent,
our analysis proceeds in two steps. In the rst, we examine stock ownership independently
of allocation, modeling the ownership decision as a binary outcome (while still accounting
for unobserved heterogeneity)|rst with a standard random eect probit, then a correlated
random eect probit, and then Honor e's conditional xed eect logit model. In the second
step, we consider the joint determination of allocation and participation, beginning with
a standard random eects Tobit model, then moving to correlated random eects Tobit
specications, and nally Honor e's xed eects censored regression model.15
Because households that are approaching retirement may respond to health shocks very
dierently than households already in retirement, we run separate regressions for respon-
dents younger than 70 and for those 70 and older. The logic behind the age division is that
13For recent applications of this estimator to models of portfolio choice, see Alan and Leth-Petersen
(2006) and Hochguertel (2003). Hochguertel uses a one-sided FE Tobit to study the eects of precautionary
behavior on portfolio choice, and Alan and Leth-Peterson use the two-side model to estimate the importance
of marginal tax rates. As far as we know, we are the rst to apply the method to analyze the eects of
health on portfolio decisions.
14We implement Honor e's two-sided LAD estimator using Gauss code available at the author's website:
http://www.princeton.edu/~honore/programs/2side.
15Ideally, we would like to account for unobservable heterogeneity at the same time as selection into stock
holding. The estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (1997), essentially a panel-version of Heckman's (1979) two-
step method, suits this purpose nicely. This estimator, however, is identied by observations which move
across the extensive margin over time (e.g., go from zero to positive stock holding or vice versa), which is a
small and select group in our case. In addition, when we implemented the estimator, we found that it was
quite sensitive to assumptions about the bandwidth constant on the kernel function, so that dierent values
would generate very dierent estimates.
10younger households can respond to health shocks by adjusting labor supply, an option not
generally available to older households.16
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Stock Ownership
Table 5 shows the results from our three specications of stock ownership.17 The left-hand
panel reports the baseline random eects estimates for younger and older households in
our sample.18 Financial wealth, non-nancial wealth, non-capital income, and education
are all strongly and positively associated with stock ownership, consistent with previous
studies and likely re
ecting factors such as nancial and/or informational barriers to entry
in asset markets. In addition, households expecting to leave a bequest are much more
likely to own stock. In terms of household characteristics, single males and older single
females are more likely to own stock than married couples (the omitted category), while
younger single females are less likely. The coecients on whether households have children
are insignicant.
In this specication, self-reported health is strongly and signicantly negatively related
to stock ownership for the younger households in the sample.19 We estimate a marginal
eect of self-reported health (ranked 1{5) of around negative 2.1 percent, which is in the
neighborhood of the estimates in Rosen and Wu.20 The marginal eect of self-reported
health status is smaller for older households|around negative 0.7 percent|but still negative
and signicant. Higher log out-of-pocket medical expenses, on the other hand, are associated
with higher probabilities of stock ownership|consistent with our descriptive evidence that
suggested OOP expenses might have discretionary or \luxury good" aspects. The coecient
on medical costs is roughly twice as large for older households as it is for younger households.
These ndings are consistent with Rosen and Wu's (2004) explanation for their empirical
ndings. Building on the logic in Bodie, Merton, and Samuelson (1992), they argue that
16An alternative way of dividing the sample is to follow Rosen and Wu (2004) and consider single and
married households separately. We experimented with splitting the sample by marital status, but it did not
have a signicant eect on our general ndings about health and portfolio choice. The estimates for couples
were generally similar to those for singles, but with smaller coecients and marginal eects.
17In all of the regressions, we restrict our sample to households with more than $0 and less than $6 million
in nancial assets.
18Table 7 shows the results for the full sample, unconditional on age.
19The ratio of the marginal eects to the coecient estimates is relatively constant across the covariates.
To conserve space, we report the average ratios at the bottom of Tables 5-7. They range between 20 and 30
percent for the probit and tobit specications.
20The self-reported health variable in Rosen and Wu is an indicator for being in fair or poor health. When
we estimate our equations using their denition, we obtain nearly identical results as in the specication
above. The marginal eect associated with fair to poor health|the Rosen and Wu measure|is negative 2.3
percent. The standard error, however, more than doubles when we move to the indicator health variable.
11sick households are less able to absorb low asset returns by adjusting labor supply and
therefore tend to shift toward safer portfolio allocations. Under this interpretation, younger
households would be more responsive to changes in health status because of the labor supply
channel, while older households would worry more about large out-of-pocket medical costs.
The question remains, however, whether these ndings represent a true causal relationship,
or rather bias due to correlation between the random eect and observables.
The middle panel of Table 5 reports the results for the correlated random eects speci-
cation, which allows for such correlation. For brevity, we report only the slope coecients on
the regressors of interest, and not the estimated correlations between the unobservables and
the independent variables. It is worth noting, however, that many of the latter estimates
share the signs and signicance levels of the estimates in the random-eects regression,
suggesting that the random eects and observables are indeed correlated|a signicant vi-
olation of a key assumption in the standard random eects specication that results in
inconsistent estimates.
In the correlated random eects specication, the marginal eect of health is reduced by
almost half among younger households, and we nd essentially no correlation among older
households. For both age groups, the coecient estimates on out-of-pocket medical costs
become statistically insignicant, with point estimates close to zero. These results suggest
that much of the correlation between health and portfolio choice is due to unobserved
heterogeneity across households, rather than a causal link.
The right-hand panel of Table 5 shows that the xed-eects results are similar.21 As
with all xed eects estimators, however, this specication has the disadvantage that it only
includes explanatory variables that vary within a household over time. Thus we are unable
to estimate the slope coecients of potentially interesting variables such as education, race,
and gender. Another drawback associated with the xed eects estimator is its tendency to
exacerbate the eects of measurement error, particularly if there is comparatively limited
\within" variation (Bound, Brown, and Mathiowetz, 2001). In our case, the eect of health
on ownership is identied by changes in health and stock ownership over our 8-year sample
period. If a large fraction of the changes in ownership status simply re
ects measurement
error, the coecient estimates may be noisily measured indeed. Because the imprecision of
our estimates may be due to measurement error, we interpret our results as evidence against
evidence: we do not nd any eect of health on risky asset ownership within households.22
It may not be surprising to nd a weak connection between changes in stock ownership
21A drawback of the conditional xed eect logit is that one cannot estimate marginal eects at the
individual level.
22As a robustness check to see whether our results are due to the nonlinear nature of our limited dependent
variable, we also estimated a set of xed eects linear probability models. In these specications, the health
coecients were also statistically insignicant and close to zero.
12and changes in health|should we really expect households who suer a negative health
shock to exit the stock market, or an older individual in improved health to decide to
purchase stocks for the rst time? On the intensive margin, however, we might expect a
more easily measurable relationship. Changes in health status and out-of-pocket medical
costs represent substantial background risks that should, according to theory, diminish the
demand for risky assets.
4.2 Stock Allocation
Table 6 shows the results from our three specications of stock allocation. The left-hand
panel reports the results for our baseline random eects Tobit regression of stock share on
health.23 In this specication we nd a clear and precisely measured relationship between
health status and portfolio allocation: a one-percentage point increase in self-reported health
(ranked 1-5, with 5=poor) is associated with about a 0.75 percent reduction in the stock
share of nancial wealth for younger households and about a 0.35 percent reduction in the
stock share for older households. These ndings are lower than those in Rosen and Wu's
estimates of 1-2 percentage points, but they imply a similarly large adjustment when we
account for the fact that Rosen and Wu use an indicator for poor health, rather than a
categorical variable.24
We also nd a positive relationship between OOP expenses and the stock share. A
mechanical explanation for this relationship is that some households may be reluctant to
nance out-of-pocket expenses out of stocks and choose instead to pay for them out of safe
assets. In this case, the share of stock could rise even if the total value of stocks remains
unchanged. In addition, this result might be related to the discretionary nature of some
medical costs: if households can choose dierent levels of medical care, high out-of-pocket
medical expenses might be correlated with unobserved shocks to future income and non-
medical expenses.25
But again, we must take care not to impose a causal gloss on these results if we suspect
correlation between the unobserved random eect and observables. In the correlated random
eects specication, shown in the middle panel of Table 6, we nd that self-reported health
is still negatively correlated with stock share for younger households, but the estimated
marginal eect is about 25 percent lower. As with the case of the ownership regressions,
we nd essentially no correlation among older households. In addition, the strong, positive
23Again, see Table 7 for estimates for the full sample, unconditional on age.
24When we estimate our equations using their indicator variable for health, we estimate the coecient on
self-reported health to be about 1 percent.
25A related issue concerns accidental portfolio rebalancing due to 
uctuations in the stock market. Because
of trading costs and other frictions, households may not continuously rebalance their portfolios in response to
market 
uctuations (see, e.g., Liu (2004)). Nevertheless, as long as health shocks cause some households to
hit their decision threshold, we should still be able to pick up such a relationship in our empirical estimates.
13coecent estimates on out-of-pocket expenses found in the baseline random eects speci-
cation vanish once we allow for correlated random eects. This is what we might expect
since it would be surprising if higher out-of-pocket medical costs actually led to increased
stock exposure. Thus, we nd that much of the correlation between health and portfolio
allocation seems to be due to unobserved heterogeneity rather than to represent a causal
link.
The right-hand panels show the results for the xed-eect specication. Again we nd
that the xed eects specication attenuates both the magnitude and statistical signicance
of the coecient estimates. The loss of signicance may be driven partly by the tendency
for measurement error in the explanatory variables to increase the noise-to-signal ratio in a
xed eect regression. Attenuation bias due to measurement error is typically exacerbated
in the xed eects framework. Because the xed eects estimator only uses information
about changes in variables within observations, it tends to decrease the signal-to-noise ratio
and therefore the reliability associated with each coecient estimate. Nevertheless, because
we do nd signicant xed eects estimates for younger households, measurement error is
unlikely to be the sole explanation for the statistically insignicant and small estimates for
older households.
One interpretation of these results is that while health may be useful for explaining
dierences across individuals and households, it exerts no obvious in
uence on portfolio
decisions for older households over time. An alternative explanation is that health matters
for portfolio choice, but that the eect is not contemporaneous with the change in health
status. For example, individuals currently in poor (or good) health may have adjusted their
portfolios the moment|potentially years in the past|that they learned of their expected
health outcomes. Alternatively, it may take households a long time to adjust to health
shocks. Although the expectation or lagged-response stories are possible, it seems somewhat
of a stretch considering that the HRS waves are two years apart. For these stories to be
materially aecting our results, household expectations or lagged responses would have to
take place more than two years in advance of, or following, the health shock.
Two main messages emerge from the results from these ndings. First, failing to account
for unobserved heterogeneity can generate biased estimates of the eect of health on portfolio
choice. Most dramatically, this can be seen in the vanishing signicance of out-of-pocket
medical costs when we move to the correlated random eects and xed eects specications.
Second, by controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we also learn that the connection
between health and portfolio choice depends critically on the age of the households. Younger
households show a small response to health on both the intensive and extensive margins,
while older households do not.
145 Conclusion
We test whether the relationship between health and portfolio choice persists after ac-
counting carefully for the eects of unobserved heterogeneity, and we nd that it does,
at a reduced level, for younger households. For older households, we nd no evidence that
health operates on either the extensive margin of stock ownership or on the intensive margin
of asset allocation. Once we account for unobserved eects through a correlated random
eects model or a xed eects estimator, the estimates on the health variables for older
households become small and statistically insignicant. One explanation for this result is
that health and portfolio choice are unrelated for older households. However, there are
other possible explanations, including measurement error in the health variables, the role
of expectations, and heterogeneity across similar households in the relationship between
health and portfolios.
Finally, our results could be re
ecting the ambiguous relationship between health and
portfolio choice. Theoretically, the eect of health on allocation decisions depends on how
health aects the marginal utility of consumption. Since this derivative can plausibly take
either a positive or a negative sign, the net eect of health is ambiguous|some households
might respond to worsening health by increasing their stock share, while others might move
toward safer assets. Or, if the opposing forces of health on desired consumption aect each
household's utility in the same way, our nding could re
ect genuine ambivalence at the
household level.
No matter what the interpretation, though, our ndings indicate that the empirical re-
lationship between health and portfolio choice is far less clear than previous studies suggest.
If such a relationship exists, it appears to operate largely for younger households and with
a small overall eect.
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17Tables and Figures
Table 1: Demographics in 1998
Variable Age < 70 Age  70 All
Age 59 78 66
Married .55 .38 .49
Single Female .29 .47 .36
Single Male .16 .14 .15
High School .55 .51 .52
College .28 .17 .20
Nonwhite .17 .11 .14
Hispanic .08 .05 .06
Number of Children 3.0 2.9 3.0
Sample Size 7,824 5,879 13,703
Means calculated using HRS sample weights.
Table 2: Mean Household Wealth and Portfolio Shares
Variable 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Age < 70 in 1998
Financial Wealth 100.6 105.1 107.0 164.6 162.3
Retirement Accounts 107.5 96.3 98.7 115.2 172.3
Nonnancial Wealth 221.3 206.1 259.0 291.3 373.1
Owns Stocks in FW .320 .309 .290 .268 .224
Stock Share of FW .218 .237 .235 .205 .172
Age  70 in 1998
Financial Wealth 134.9 122.2 139.9 157.0 168.5
Retirement Accounts 35.6 34.7 31.0 32.0 28.8
Nonnancial Wealth 168.6 147.0 181.2 194.1 255.1
Owns Stocks in FW .306 .282 .235 .205 .172
Stock Share of FW .194 .208 .194 .200 .194
Means are calculated using HRS sample weights. Wealth val-
ues are in thousands and reported in 2006 dollars.
18Table 3: Means of Health Measures
Variable 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006
Age < 70 in 1998
Self-reported Health Status
1 3.00 2.92 3.00 3.08 3.10
Number of Diagnosed Conditions
2 1.62 1.83 2.08 2.32 2.56
Mean OOP Medical Expense
3 2,758 2,975 4,796 5,932 4,948
Age  70 in 1998
Self-reported Health Status
1 3.30 3.21 3.28 3.27 3.29
Number of Diagnosed Conditions
2 2.22 2.38 2.60 2.74 2.92
Mean OOP Medical Expense
3 3,178 4,030 6,474 7,966 7,021
1Index from 1=Excellent to 5=Poor.
2Number of following conditions: high BP, diabetes, cancer, lung disease,
heart problems, stroke, psych. problems, arthritis.
3Out-of-pocket medical expenses, in real 2006 dollars.
Table 4: Stock Allocation and Ownership by Health Status
Allocation Ownership
Variable Age < 70 Age  70 Age < 70 Age  70
Self-reported Health Status
Excellent or Very Good .259 .243 .422 .391
Good .206 .207 .320 .336
Fair or Poor .134 .155 .177 .232
Number of Diagnosed Conditions
None .235 .211 .364 .333
One to Three .196 .204 .296 .324
Four to Eight .127 .164 .176 .247
Out of Pocket Medical Expenses
Lower Third .165 .143 .229 .204
Middle Third .224 .205 .347 .338
Upper Third .224 .230 .358 .372
Allocation measures share of nancial assets allocated to stock. Ownership mea-
sures probability of owning any stock. Means calculated using HRS sample weights.
19Table 5: Stock Ownership Estimates
RE CRE FE
Explanatory Variable Age< 70 Age 70 Age< 70 Age 70 Age< 70 Age 70
Self-reported health -0.075*** -0.032 -0.046* 0.025 -0.083* 0.048
(0.016) (0.020) (0.022) (0.025) (0.040) (0.049)
Log OOP med costs 0.026** 0.042*** 0.003 0.013 -0.003 0.034
(0.008) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020) (0.024)
Prob. leave beq 0.380*** 0.318*** 0.123* 0.130 0.163 0.246
(0.045) (0.054) (0.059) (0.067) (0.106) (0.126)
Health insurance 0.029 0.112 0.012 0.200 -0.000 0.667
(0.058) (0.192) (0.071) (0.212) (0.129) (0.415)
Log net n assets 0.449*** 0.644*** 0.318*** 0.487*** 0.538*** 0.783***
(0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.019) (0.028) (0.039)
Log non-n wealth 0.023*** 0.024** 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.013) (0.019)
Log income, exl. cap gains 0.009 0.008 0.020* -0.019 0.037* -0.054
(0.007) (0.025) (0.008) (0.029) (0.015) (0.054)
Single male 0.032 0.016 0.053 -0.031 0.048 -0.129
(0.057) (0.068) (0.103) (0.100) (0.191) (0.192)
Single female -0.024 0.142* -0.076 0.117 -0.157 0.157
(0.048) (0.061) (0.117) (0.117) (0.218) (0.218)
Age 0.002 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004)
Any children 0.068 -0.034 0.092 0.006
(0.064) (0.085) (0.066) (0.089)
High school 0.435*** 0.537*** 0.340*** 0.363***
(0.066) (0.073) (0.069) (0.077)
College 0.751*** 1.021*** 0.545*** 0.693***
(0.074) (0.090) (0.078) (0.097)
Nonwhite -0.362*** -0.381*** -0.241*** -0.146
(0.058) (0.110) (0.060) (0.117)
Hispanic -0.588*** -0.968*** -0.537*** -0.833***
(0.096) (0.188) (0.100) (0.199)
Receiving Soc Sec 0.021 0.032 0.024 0.088 -0.057 0.108
(0.041) (0.086) (0.035) (0.088) (0.090) (0.223)
Year: 2000 0.045 0.116* 0.051 0.103* 0.058 0.166
(0.036) (0.048) (0.036) (0.049) (0.069) (0.092)
Year: 2002 -0.057 -0.124* -0.037 -0.121* -0.052 -0.194*
(0.039) (0.049) (0.039) (0.050) (0.074) (0.097)
Year: 2004 -0.157*** -0.123* -0.122** -0.117* -0.176* -0.165
(0.039) (0.051) (0.039) (0.053) (0.082) (0.103)
Year: 2006 -0.367*** -0.396*** -0.342*** -0.403*** -0.546*** -0.619***
(0.043) (0.053) (0.043) (0.055) (0.091) (0.109)
Constant -6.626*** -10.215*** -7.824*** -10.982***
(0.297) (0.519) (0.283) (0.649)
Avg. marg. eect/coe 0.274 0.220 0.266 0.200
N 24,315 20,403 24,315 20,403 8,125 5,624
Notes: This table reports the coecient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for random eects (RE)
and correlated random eects (CRE) probit and xed eects (FE) logit specications. The dependent variable is
an indicator variable for whether the household owns a positive amount of stocks outside of retirement accounts.
Avg. marg. eect/coe is the average ratio of the marginal eect to the coecient estimate. Self-reported health
(1{5, with 5=poor) is the maximum reported value within a household. Prob. leave beq is the self-reported
probability of leaving a bequest of at least $100,000. Age is the maximum age within the household. Receiving
Soc Sec is an indicator for whether the household receives at least $1,000 of Social Security retirement benets.
1998-2006 waves of the HRS. Values converted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U. Statistical signicance is indicated
as follows: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001.
20Table 6: Stock Allocation Estimates
RE CRE FE
Explanatory Variable Age< 70 Age 70 Age< 70 Age 70 Age< 70 Age 70
Self-reported health -0.025*** -0.012* -0.019* 0.002 -0.020 -0.009
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Log OOP med costs 0.009** 0.011*** -0.000 0.002 -0.006 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Prob. leave beq 0.115*** 0.070*** 0.018 0.006 -0.004 -0.008
(0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.018) (0.033) (0.026)
Health insurance 0.012 0.061 0.009 0.069
(0.021) (0.055) (0.025) (0.059)
Log net n assets 0.170*** 0.187*** 0.122*** 0.140*** 0.152 0.162
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.009)
Log non-n wealth 0.006** 0.005** -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Log income, exl. cap gains 0.003 -0.005 0.006* -0.012 0.007 -0.025
(0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.008) (0.003) (0.012)
Single male 0.036 0.011 0.059 -0.004 0.068 -0.033
(0.021) (0.019) (0.036) (0.026) (0.057) (0.039)
Single female -0.008 0.036* -0.056 0.018 -0.081 -0.011
(0.018) (0.017) (0.041) (0.032) (0.052) (0.051)
Age -0.001 0.004**
(0.001) (0.001)
Any children 0.045 0.003 0.052* 0.016
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
High school 0.173*** 0.167*** 0.138*** 0.104***
(0.025) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023)
College 0.264*** 0.306*** 0.189*** 0.187***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)
Nonwhite -0.104*** -0.122*** -0.059** -0.041
(0.022) (0.033) (0.022) (0.034)
Hispanic -0.204*** -0.255*** -0.180*** -0.202***
(0.036) (0.056) (0.037) (0.058)
Receiving Soc Sec 0.007 -0.008 0.002 0.005
(0.014) (0.024) (0.012) (0.024)
Year: 2000 0.027* 0.031* 0.028* 0.029* 0.046 0.031
(0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016)
Year: 2002 -0.025 -0.021 -0.018 -0.018 -0.011 0.006
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.017) (0.017)
Year: 2004 -0.062*** -0.020 -0.049*** -0.015 -0.045 0.011
(0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.018)
Year: 2006 -0.130*** -0.077*** -0.118*** -0.073*** -0.108 -0.027
(0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.020) (0.020)
Constant -2.388*** -2.853*** -2.811*** -3.109***
Avg. marg. eect/coe 0.3000 0.2849 0.2964 0.2746
N 23,665 20,173 23,665 20,173 21,359 18,097
Notes: This table reports the coecient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for random eects
(RE), correlated random eects (CRE), and xed eects (FE) Tobit specications (see Honor e and Leth-
Petersen 2006 for censored xed eects method). The dependent variable is the nancial wealth share of
stocks held outside of retirement accounts. Avg. marg. eect/coe is the average ratio of the marginal
eects to the coecient estimates. Self-reported health (1{5, with 5=poor) is the maximum reported value
within a household. Prob. leave beq is the self-reported probability of leaving a bequest of at least $100,000.
Age is the maximum age within the household. Receiving Soc Sec is an indicator for whether the household
receives at least $1,000 of Social Security retirement benets. 1998-2006 waves of the HRS. Values converted
to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U. Statistical signicance is indicated as follows: * p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, ***
p < 0:001.
21Table 7: Ownership and Allocation Estimates for Full Sample
Ownership Allocation
Explanatory Variable RE CRE FE CRE RE FE
Self-reported health -0.055*** -0.016 -0.036 -0.018*** -0.007 -0.009
(0.013) (0.016) (0.030) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Log OOP med costs 0.030*** 0.005 0.006 0.010*** 0.000 -0.004
(0.006) (0.008) (0.015) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Prob. leave beq 0.357*** 0.121** 0.216** 0.096*** 0.014 -0.008
(0.034) (0.043) (0.077) (0.011) (0.014) (0.019)
Health insurance 0.012 0.022 -0.006 0.010 0.011
(0.058) (0.068) (0.122) (0.019) (0.022)
Log net n assets 0.515*** 0.381*** 0.635*** 0.175*** 0.131*** 0.160
(0.009) (0.011) (0.022) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006)
Log non-n wealth 0.020*** -0.000 -0.000 0.005** -0.002 0.000
(0.004) (0.006) (0.010) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Log income, exl. cap gains 0.012 0.018* 0.031* 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Single male 0.024 -0.002 -0.055 0.029* 0.029 0.035
(0.044) (0.068) (0.124) (0.014) (0.020) (0.029)
Single female 0.042 0.010 0.021 0.015 -0.006 -0.028
(0.038) (0.078) (0.141) (0.013) (0.025) (0.033)
Age 0.009*** 0.002**
(0.002) (0.001)
Any children 0.023 0.056 0.024 0.033
(0.052) (0.054) (0.017) (0.018)
High school 0.498*** 0.346*** 0.176*** 0.120***
(0.049) (0.052) (0.017) (0.017)
College 0.874*** 0.575*** 0.286*** 0.176***
(0.058) (0.061) (0.019) (0.020)
Nonwhite -0.395*** -0.246*** -0.116*** -0.058**
(0.054) (0.057) (0.019) (0.019)
Hispanic -0.681*** -0.614*** -0.219*** -0.188***
(0.091) (0.095) (0.031) (0.032)
Receiving Soc Sec -0.036 0.060* -0.049 -0.024* -0.005
(0.035) (0.029) (0.075) (0.011) (0.009)
Year: 2000 0.067* 0.069* 0.104 0.028** 0.029*** 0.037
(0.028) (0.029) (0.053) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Year: 2002 -0.091** -0.074* -0.115* -0.025** -0.020* -0.012
(0.029) (0.030) (0.056) (0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Year: 2004 -0.148*** -0.126*** -0.190** -0.044*** -0.036*** -0.028
(0.030) (0.030) (0.059) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Year: 2006 -0.387*** -0.368*** -0.594*** -0.107*** -0.100*** -0.088
(0.031) (0.032) (0.064) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013)
Constant -7.944*** -8.944*** -2.589*** -2.933***
(0.206) (0.253) (0.065) (0.080)
Avg. marg. eect/coe 0.2546 0.2434 0.2929 0.2865
N 44,718 44,718 15,174 43,838 43,838 41,067
Notes: This table reports the coecient estimates and standard errors (in parentheses) for random eects
(RE), correlated random eects (CRE), and xed eects (FE) specications. The dependent variable in
the ownership regressions is an indicator variable for whether the household owns a positive amount of
stocks outside of retirement accounts. The dependent variable in the allocation regressions is the nancial
wealth share of stocks held outside of retirement accounts. Avg. marg. eect/coe is the average ratio of
the marginal eect to the coecient estimate. Self-reported health (1{5, with 5=poor) is the maximum
reported value within a household. Prob. leave beq is the self-reported probability of leaving a bequest of
at least $100,000. Age is the maximum age within the household. Receiving Soc Sec is an indicator for
whether the household receives at least $1,000 of Social Security retirement benets. 1998-2006 waves of
the HRS. Values converted to 2006 dollars using the CPI-U. Statistical signicance is indicated as follows:
* p < 0:05, ** p < 0:01, *** p < 0:001. 22